Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance by Doug Bandow
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has returned from the Republic of Korea (ROK), where he reaffirmed “the solid U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea.” Troop levels will fall no lower than twenty-five thousand, to be reached after modest reductions this year. The goal, he adds, is to turn the relationship into a “twenty-first century strategic alliance.”
Actually, the right twenty-first century alliance is no alliance.
U.S. troops have been in the ROK for more than a half century. In 1950 Washington rescued the South after North Korea invaded the American client state. In 1953, when the conflict came to its inconclusive end, the United States inked a “mutual” defense treaty to guarantee South Korea’s security. Since then Seoul has been dependent upon America for its security.
That made sense in the early years. The ROK was desperately poor, having been ravaged by three years of war. The South was a political wreck, sliding from authoritarian, nominal democracy to military dictatorship. Chinese troops remained on station in the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Stalin was dead, but the cold war continued. By any measure, U.S. policy succeeded. The ROK took off economically and now possesses the world’s twelfth-largest economy. The country developed politically as well, as democracy took hold. At the same time, the North essentially imploded, falling backward economically, suffering a murderous famine, and losing its mega-communist allies. Today Seoul dominates virtually every measure of comparative national power, with a GDP on the order of forty times that of the DPRK, twice the population and an enormous technological edge. South Korea is an important international player, while Pyongyang would be a nullity, absent its nuclear program.
Yet the alliance remains essentially unchanged. Various administrations have drawn down U.S. forces, but American troops remain on station, guaranteeing the ROK’s security. Indeed, Secretary Gates has decided to lengthen army tours in South Korea and allow families to join service personnel. General Walter L. Sharp, the new commander of U.S. forces in Korea, says “We must be prepared to fight and win.” He adds: “Our purpose is to continue to deter aggression on the Korean peninsula and, should deterrence fail, with immediate and overwhelming firepower and the U.S. will defeat that threat.” Insists Secretary Gates, “We will maintain at least the same capabilities we have here, or perhaps be able to enhance them.” Whatever for?
The North retains a nominal military superiority, but its antiquated weapons are no match for South Korea’s arsenal, backed by much-better-trained personnel. Moreover, the South could spend far more on its defense. There is no artifact of geography that keeps the ROK’s military smaller than North Korea’s. That results from a choice made by the government in Seoul. But it chooses not to, perhaps because the South Koreans aren’t convinced that the DPRK poses much of a threat. The South has cheerfully sent generous aid and investment northward. Polls of younger South Koreans find more hostility toward America than Pyongyang. If the ROK’s population doesn’t believe the threat from the North warrants greater military effort, why should America underwrite South Korea’s defense?
Some analysts on both sides of the Pacific contend that the alliance is necessary to respond to North Korean nuclear developments. However, absent the U.S. military presence—which provides a convenient target for Pyongyang—the prospect of a DPRK bomb would be a regional rather than an American problem. Washington still would have an interest in encouraging a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, but withdrawing the troops would increase American flexibility. Supporters of the status quo also advocate giving the bilateral relationship a new purpose. After the Gates meeting, the two countries issued a press release which “expressed a shared perception of the need for stronger cooperation in order to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a 21st Century Strategic Alliance and agreed to exert a joint effort for the creative development of the ROK-U.S. relationship.”
Which means precisely what? Some Americans view South Korea as a key member of an anti-China alliance. But while the ROK might enjoy being protected from Beijing in the extraordinarily unlikely event of Chinese aggression, the South has no interest in joining with an American crusade against the PRC. Indeed, the ROK’s ties with Beijing continue to grow. Two-way trade between China and South Korea runs $145 billion, more than between the U.S. and the South. Popular South Korean attitudes towards the People’s Republic of China vary—recent thuggish behavior by Chinese students towards demonstrators protesting repression in Tibet was ill-received in the South, for instance. But it is hard to find a resident of the ROK enthused about confronting the PRC. Indeed, more young people fear the U.S. than either China or the DPRK. Moreover, in May South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Beijing, where he and Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that they had “agreed to upgrade ties from a partnership of comprehensive cooperation to a future-oriented strategic partnership.”
The most likely scenario for conflict between the United States and China involves Taiwan. However, the prospect that Seoul will turn itself into a permanent enemy of a likely superpower with a long memory to help defend Taiwan approximates zero. America’s East Asian allies might want Washington to stick around to counterbalance assorted feared states (variously China, Japan and Russia), but have little incentive to put themselves at risk to advance perceived U.S. interests.
But if China was not the target of a revamped alliance, what would be the purpose? Aggression by Japan or anyone else is inconceivable. The most common sources of conflict are neither important for U.S. security nor amenable to U.S. military action—Burma, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands, for example. If South Korea or other nearby states want a local geopolitical policeman, let one or more of them perform that role.
The pro-alliance mantra includes promoting regional stability, but the contention that East Asia would dissolve into chaos and war without Uncle Sam’s restraining hand is both arrogant and presumptuous. Everyone in the region has an interest in preserving peace and promoting prosperity. North Korea remains a problem state but the threat of war on the Korean peninsula has diminished dramatically; the result of the recent Taiwanese election has moderated fears about potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beyond these two cases, there are no obvious bilateral controversies with much likelihood of flaring into violence.
Still, does an American presence dampen geopolitical rivalries and arms races? Washington’s role as de facto security guarantor might discourage allied states from doing more for their own defense, but that is a dubious benefit since the belief that the United States will intervene encourages countries to be more belligerent in any disputes with other nations. Moreover, America’s presence virtually forces Beijing to upgrade its military, lest it remain permanently vulnerable to foreign coercion. That is the worst dynamic possible—weakening friendly nations and keeping them permanently dependent on Washington, while convincing China that only a sustained military buildup will enable it to deter U.S. intervention.
America’s interests would be best served by the development of a regional balance of power, in which friendly nations act to protect their own interests and constrain the PRC. In 1950 the ROK would have been swallowed had the United States not intervened. In the early succeeding years South Korea could not have defended itself. But those days are long over.
So it is with other countries in the region. Japan is the second-ranking economic power on earth. Australia has taken an active military role in Southeast Asia and the south Pacific. Vietnam has developed a friendly relationship with the United States. India’s political influence and military forces now reach into Southeast Asia. All of this makes for a more-complicated world, but also almost certainly a safer one for America.
Yet Washington is locked in the past. We are told that U.S. troops must remain in South Korea to defend that nation from ever-diminishing threats, threats which the ROK is capable of handling. As the world changes, so should American security commitments and military deployments. Much of Washington’s global security structure is outdated. Nowhere is that more obvious than on the Korean peninsula. The only way to create a “twenty-first century strategic alliance” with the South is to end today’s outmoded twentieth-century alliance.
Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and the author of several books, including The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (coauthor, Palgrave/Macmillan) and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Cato Institute).
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