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French President Nicolas Sarkozy has become a neoconservative heart-throb since he appears to genuinely admire the U.S. He also is a Mercantilist, protectionist, and nationalist. Common positions all, but none advance America's interest.
Browbeating Ireland to reverse the results of its recent referendum rejecting the Lisbon Treaty, which would consolidate power in Brussels and create, nominally, at least, a united European defense and foreign policy, has become Sarkozy's latest passion. He also wants to enhance European military power.
The former is a dubious venture, since the flow of power to Brussels almost certainly means a respective flow of liberty away from the European people. But this is Europe's, not America's, business. Sarkozy's military gambit is a more positive venture and provides Washington with an opportunity to say "Au Revoir" to its promise to defend Europe.
Until World War II, Europe contained several major if not great powers, while the U.S. was a military midget. The U.S. foolishly abandoned its policy of continental defense and nonintervention in European wars in 1917, briefly demonstrating its globe-spanning military potential,.
Unfortunately, its decision to ally with several imperial powers against several imperial powers led to an unbalanced European peace embodied in the Versailles Treaty, which contained the seeds of conflict in virtually every clause. When the new war came, the threats were far more virulent. With either Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia poised to dominate Eurasia, it was hard for the U.S. to avoid joining the murderfest.
Before the war even Italy had a bigger military than did America. When peace came to Europe in May 1945 the U.S. vied with the Soviet Union as the globe's greatest military power. Washington continued in that role throughout the extended Cold War, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to guarantee the security of the war-torn and demoralized western European states.
Such a policy made sense during the 1950s and 1960s. But as NATO's European members recovered economically, surpassing the Soviet Union and its dismal Eastern Bloc, the American-dominated alliance appeared to do more to deter European military spending than Soviet aggression. The Europeans saw no reason to cut back on their welfare states to provide for their own defense. In their view, the threat from Moscow was an insufficient reason not to construct a natural gas pipeline to the U.S.S.R. European states similarly believed Washington's antagonism towards the Nicaraguan Sandinistas to be of no account in determining their own policy towards the new Marxist state in America's backyard.
Little has changed over the last two decades, even though the Soviet Union collapsed, Warsaw Pact dissolved, Berlin Wall fell, and one-time Soviet satellites and constituent republics scurried to join the EU and NATO. The Europeans still leave their defense up to Washington, while subsidizing inefficient welfare states and disdaining U.S. international priorities.
The result is truly scandalous. When the world's greatest, most powerful alliance grandly went off to its first war in 1999, bombing hapless Yugoslavia over its attempt to prevent Kosovo's secession (following standard European policy: remember Spain and the Basques, Britain and the Irish, and Turkey and the Kurds), the Europeans did little other than applaud. After all, they acknowledged, while their combined economy and population exceeded those of America, their united combat effectiveness was only about ten to fifteen percent of that of the U.S. One was tempted to ask, why did they bother maintaining militaries?
Nothing has changed since then. The practical firepower of NATO's European members remains dismal. Yet the alliance keeps expanding, drawing in such powerhouses as Slovenia, Estonia, and Bulgaria, with Albania, Macedonia, and Georgia clamoring to get in the door.
While the Europeans periodically chatter about creating a continental defense policy, they leave their security in Washington's hands. Moreover, the U.S. is expected to do the military heavy-lifting every where else. America provides most outside troops in Iraq, the majority of foreign forces in Afghanistan, large garrisons in South Korea and Japan, and ships to patrol the globe's oceans, seas, gulfs, and straits. The U.S. is the only nation, other, perhaps, than Israel, with the capacity to attack Iran, and is the ultimate guarantor against Russian or Chinese aggression.
While Europe has divided over some of these policies, particularly Iraq, most European states have been happy to pocket any geopolitical benefits from Washington's actions while carping on the sidelines. Other than Britain, the Europeans do nothing meaningful in Iraq. And only Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands help out much practically – as in, really fight – in Afghanistan.
True, Germany and numerous other European nations have troops on station in the latter, but have chosen locations or imposed rules of engagement to essentially keep their forces out of combat. The Germans wouldn't even shoot a notorious Taliban leader and bomber because the Germans hadn't been fired upon first. The once feared Wehrmacht has become a gang of armed social workers. The few score soldiers provided by the likes of Albania and Estonia merely demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration's supposedly grand coalition. There's really the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and nobody else.
The alliance's terminal flaccidity is evident in its response to the growing need for troops in Afghanistan. Last year Washington's plea for an additional 3,000 soldiers went unanswered, causing the U.S. to send in another 3,200 Marines. At the April NATO summit the U.S. and Canada, whose small troop contingent has been under pressure, begged for European reinforcements. Allied commanders in Afghanistan said they needed at least 10,000 more troops.
Most NATO members mumbled while looking at the floor. Their militaries were strained, they told U.S. officials, who must scramble to maintain troops at some 800 military facilities around the globe. The alliance collected pledges for an extra 2,000 soldiers, most in dribs and drabs, but only the French actually seem to be moving to deliver, with a promised 700 men. Last week London said it planned to add 230 logistical and staff personnel.
Nor is the problem just manpower. The Europeans notoriously lack lift capacity. Their shortage of helicopters has crippled their troops' effectiveness in Afghanistan. Other equipment is poor, old, or both. One unnamed Pentagon official spoke of "despair" to the Daily Telegraph: "For many countries being in Afghanistan seems to be about keeping up appearances, rather than actually fighting a war that needs to be won." The Pentagon is considering sending up to 7,000 American more troops to Afghanistan next year, on top of the 34,000 already there. (Allied states provide about 28,000 collectively.)
But now President Sarkozy is pushing a new initiative. He wants to modernize the French military with full integration into NATO. Moreover, he advocates providing the EU with a "permanent and autonomous strategic planning capacity," creating a deployable European force of 60,000 and pooling European logistical resources.
Over the years American officials have had an odd ambivalence towards any autonomous European military initiatives. Washington always wanted Europe to do more – but under U.S. control. The whining grew deafening at the thought that the Europeans might create an independent military capability. Horrors! Our populous and prosperous allies might decide to do something with guidance and permission from Washington. What is the world coming to?
Instead of balking, the U.S. should offer encouragement. Left unsupported, Sarkozy's proposal is unlikely to come to much. His government is about to assume the six-month presidency of the EU Council, but the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty puts the entire campaign for Europeans political integration, with a continental president and foreign minister, managing an EU defense and foreign policy, in doubt. Moreover, every prior proposal for a European military capability, including a formal EU commitment in 1999 to create a Rapid Reaction Force, has come to naught.
Even the governments most friendly to the U.S. – in Germany, Italy, and Poland, for instance – prefer to applaud as American forces traverse the globe. The belief that they would actually spend more money, put more people in uniform, and take greater risks belongs to a late-night comedy routine.
In speaking of European contributions to NATO, British Defense Secretary Des Browne admitted that there was "far too big a mismatch between our aspirations and what we actually deliver." He pointed to the lack of enthusiasm for bolstering the alliance's military capabilities and acknowledged: "The public and politicians of many European NATO allies do not yet instinctively see expeditionary operations and capabilities as directly linked to their defense and security."
Domestic pressure is increasing among Canadians, Dutch, and Germans, in particular, to bring home their forces. Britain, too, is growing weary of participating in America's wars and plans to soon withdraw its forces from Iraq. Sarkozy might have the clout to remake the French military, but even he could have trouble dragging his nation into another U.S.-orchestrated war.
So what Washington needs to say is: it's time for Europe to defend itself.
It is truly a scandal that a continent filled with wealthy states run by politicians determined to forge a global power is unable to provide for its own defense and project sufficient military power to protect its international interests. That will change only when it has to change.
Europe could do so much more. To the extent that Russia requires deterring, it should be Europe's job. To the degree that Eastern Europe can be drawn westward, it should be Europe's job. To the extent that missile threats from Iran and similar states must be defended against, it should be Europe's job. To the extent that North Africa can be integrated with Europe, it should be Europe's job.
A stronger Europe and U.S. could then join in military action elsewhere when their interests coincide. And with a serious military capability, Europe could demand to be treated as an equal, with a decision-making role commensurate with its military contribution.
Of course, this might all be a pipe dream. Perhaps the European people will continue to believe that a serious military is unnecessary. But that's fine too. It doesn't matter much to the U.S. if the Europeans can summon up the military wherewithal to garrison Kosovo or support Georgia against Russia. Bizarrely, the Bush administration acts as if both of these issues matter to America. They don't.
Being a superpower without a hegemonic competitor gives America enormous freedom of action. Frankly, there isn't much that need concern Washington. Terrorism and proliferation pose the greatest threats today. In decades hence China and maybe India could become geopolitical peer competitors. But America's traditional security concern – that one power would dominate Eurasia – today looks like a paranoid fantasy. If the Europeans prefer to engage in global social work, let them. The U.S. can protect its own interests irrespective of the Europeans' behavior.
But doing so requires Washington to turn the defense of Europe over to the Europeans. Nazism and Communism are dead. The U.S. no longer needs to patrol the borders of Europe, whether old or new. French President Sarkozy wants a more powerful European Union. Excellent. America should use NATO's 60th anniversary next April as the moment to hand over its well-worn defense responsibilities to the Europeans.
Gorgia and Ukraine want NATO to continue its steady eastern march. Like other Central and Eastern European nations, they have felt uncomfortably close to Russia, Germany or both over the years. The problem is not confined to Europe: Korea is a famed "shrimp among whales," being the neighbor of China, Japan and Russia.
The good news is that the world has changed. Peaceful coexistence appears to be more than a propaganda slogan.
Nevertheless, countries that have been variously occupied, partitioned and dominated prefer not to trust in the goodwill of their large neighbors. Governments rarely verbalize such concerns in polite company, but the fear is no less genuine. Which is why they pine for Washington’s embrace. Indeed, Russia’s popular eruption against Estonia over the removal of a World War II memorial offers a stark reminder that Russia has yet to join Western Europe in heart and mind. The issue is not just Vladimir Putin’s calculated strangulation of democracy. Russia appears to retain both a virulent strain of nationalism and a brutal willingness to employ the military (consider Chechnya) absent in most EU members.
To the question—what to do?—the answer is obvious: enlist the services of a benevolent, distant superpower. Europe might offer a good economic home, but the very ennui that renders so many formerly great powers harmless diminishes the security value of any military alliance with them. In 1939 Great Britain bravely—or recklessly, depending on your point of view—guaranteed Poland’s borders. It is hard to imagine the British doing something similar solo today. Germany is even less likely to put its soldiers where they might be spat upon, let alone fired upon.
America is different. The United States conveniently possesses the world’s most powerful military. Moreover, truth be told, Washington seems ever ready to go to war. Its list of post-cold-war interventions is long: Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq again. President Bill Clinton almost loosed the Dogs of War against North Korea; President George W. Bush essentially threatened China with war over Taiwan shortly after taking office. More than a few American policymakers have talked about attacking Syria and Iran. Getting the United States to go to war is easy compared to dragging the Europeans into a conflagration anywhere, even on their own continent. Thus the enthusiasm of Central and Eastern Europeans for joining NATO. Surely the alliance aids efforts at continental integration and yields aid for upgrading mediocre militaries. Joining the exclusive club is particularly satisfying for countries that spent years looking in, across the famed Iron Curtain. But the most important factor is Article 5—the possibility of turning a war with Russia, however unlikely, into Europe’s, and, more importantly, America’s, war.
It’s a policy which makes eminent sense in Tbilisi, Kiev and elsewhere in the region. But it doesn’t make sense in Washington, D.C. The benefit to America of adding a host of new defense responsibilities is zero. A close relationship with multiple Central and Eastern European states provides modest economic and cultural benefits, but no obvious security gain. One reason for America’s expensive outsize military is to back its many treaty commitments. And the price of actually acting on these security guarantees could be huge: Russia remains a serious power with nuclear weapons.
Moreover, Moscow has clout where America needs it—on the UN Security Council, which affects U.S. policy toward Iran, North Korea, Kosovo and more. Russia’s nuclear dealings with Iran have variously reinforced and undercut American sanctions. Russian cooperation with the People’s Republic of China could create the framework of a serious anti-American coalition. In short, any cold-blooded assessment of U.S. interests will emphasize Washington’s relationship with Moscow over cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. The latter states have feelings of democratic solidarity, pressure from ethnic interest groups and language of treaty commitments on their side. But in a serious future crisis Washington is likely to, correctly, prefer interest over sentiment.
Fear of again becoming an afterthought in great-power competition undoubtedly concerns countries which saw enough of Russian troops during the cold war.But that possibility also suggests a strategy for the future: upgrade their militaries, create value for Washington and avoid needless confrontation with Moscow.
Relying on the United States to do the "right" thing—rush off to war, if necessary, to preserve the independence of distant countries that spent decades either as part of the Soviet Union or under its domination—out of abstract goodwill is risky at best. Countries ranging from the Czech Republic to Estonia, let alone Georgia and Ukraine, need to demonstrate that they are net security assets rather than deficits.
First and foremost that means creating modern militaries, and to do so without U.S. aid. If nations really fear Russian revanchism, they should develop potent if limited deterrent capabilities. It hardly behooves policy makers to mutter darkly about the potential for future Russian misbehavior while turning their defense over to Brussels and Washington. It also means aiding America in meeting military responsibilities outside of Europe. Poland’s and Ukraine’s commitments to Iraq, for instance, were modest, but evinced genuine effort. Warsaw’s planned withdrawal suggests that the new government expects the defense relationship to run only one way. Other nations provided bits and pieces of aid here and there, but they could have done more, contributing meaningful logistical if not combat support. Demonstrating political solidarity is fine as far as it goes, but that’s not far. A practical commitment of resources would help ensure that the bilateral relationship with the United State was give-and-take, not just take.
Participation in America’s planned missile-defense system is another area of practical defense cooperation. The Polish demand for compensation essentially requests the United States to pay twice for a defense guarantee that serves no important American interests. Finally, vulnerable countries relying on others for their defense should avoid provoking potentially threatening neighbors. Poland’s last government had an unfortunate habit of offending just about everyone. However that played in Warsaw, it was bad policy since Poland’s NATO allies would have been expected to clean up any resulting geopolitical mess.
Estonia’s contretemps with Russia over the Soviet statue was possible largely because of the nation’s membership in NATO. As a sovereign nation, Estonia obviously had the right to move the memorial. (And since the Red Army proved to be as much oppressor as liberator, Estonia was right to do so.) But prudence dictated acting in the least offensive way possible.
Having to be concerned about Moscow’s opinion might not seem fair, but as it has been said, life is unfair. Estonia is a small nation which contains a large ethnic Russian population and sits next to nationalistic Russia. As such, Tallinn has a responsibility to temper its actions so long as it expects others to defend it. To ask Washington to be ready for a nuclear facedown of Moscow to preserve Estonia’s independence is demanding enough. It’s far worse to expect America to damage its relationship with Russia, let alone risk war, so Tallinn can send a message to Moscow.
The need for restraint is even more evident in Georgia, whose relationship with Moscow is fractious at best. Tbilisi’s determination to retain control of Abkhazia and Ossetia may be legitimate, but does not warrant an allied commitment to go to war.
Throughout history, countries typically act on their interests, whatever their sentimental attachments to one nation or another. So it is likely to be with the United States in Europe.
Washington defended Western Europe against the Red Army for practical reasons of realpolitik after World War II: Soviet domination of the continent would have united the most developed regions of the globe against America. Irrespective of the rhetoric of NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, the United States has few security reasons to defend NATO’s newest members, let alone new inductees like Georgia and Ukraine. As America’s global domination inevitably shrinks, Washington is likely to reconsider such commitments. Thus, countries hoping to preserve U.S. military involvement in their regions should give Washington a reason to commit the necessary resources and take the inevitable risks of doing so. If that sounds like a throwback to great-power maneuvering in the past, so be it. Washington’s new friends can ill afford to assume that America will forever put sentiment before interest in defending them. As their history dramatically demonstrates, freedom rarely comes that cheap.
Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon Press). He is a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.
