War on Terror

Current U.S. strategy against the terrorist group al Qaida has not been successful in significantly undermining the group's capabilities, according to a new RAND Corporation study issued today.

Al Qaida has been involved in more terrorist attacks since Sept. 11, 2001, than it was during its prior history and the group's attacks since then have spanned an increasingly broader range of targets in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, according to researchers.

In looking at how other terrorist groups have ended, the RAND study found that most terrorist groups end either because they join the political process, or because local police and intelligence efforts arrest or kill key members. Police and intelligence agencies, rather than the military, should be the tip of the spear against al Qaida in most of the world, and the United States should abandon the use of the phrase "war on terrorism," researchers concluded.

"The United States cannot conduct an effective long-term counterterrorism campaign against al Qaida or other terrorist groups without understanding how terrorist groups end," said Seth Jones, the study's lead author and a political scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "In most cases, military force isn't the best instrument."

The comprehensive study analyzes 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, drawing from a terrorism database maintained by RAND and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. The most common way that terrorist groups end -- 43 percent -- was via a transition to the political process. However, the possibility of a political solution is more likely if the group has narrow goals, rather than a broad, sweeping agenda like al Qaida possesses.

The second most common way that terrorist groups end -- 40 percent -- was through police and intelligence services either apprehending or killing the key leaders of these groups. Policing is especially effective in dealing with terrorists because police have a permanent presence in cities that enables them to efficiently gather information, Jones said.

Military force was effective in only 7 percent of the cases examined; in most instances, military force is too blunt an instrument to be successful against terrorist groups, although it can be useful for quelling insurgencies in which the terrorist groups are large, well-armed and well-organized, according to researchers. In a number of cases, the groups end because they become splintered, with members joining other groups or forming new factions. Terrorist groups achieved victory in only 10 percent of the cases studied.

Jones says the study has crucial implications for U.S. strategy in dealing with al Qaida and other terrorist groups. Since al Qaida's goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, a political solution or negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle East is highly unlikely. The terrorist organization also has made numerous enemies and does not enjoy the kind of mass support received by other organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, largely because al Qaida has not engaged in sponsoring any welfare services, medical clinics, or hospitals.

The study recommends the United States should adopt a two-front strategy: rely on policing and intelligence work to root out the terrorist leaders in Europe, North America, Asia and the Middle East, and involve military force -- though not necessarily the U.S. military -- when insurgencies are involved.

The United States also should avoid the use of the term, "war on terror," and replace it with the term "counterterrorism." Nearly every U.S. ally, including the United Kingdom and Australia, has stopped using "war on terror," and Jones said it's more than a mere matter of semantics.

"The term we use to describe our strategy toward terrorists is important, because it affects what kinds of forces you use," Jones said. "Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors, and our analysis suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism."

Among the other findings, the study notes:

• Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. Since 1968, approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended, while only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have done so.
• No religious terrorist group has achieved victory since 1968.
• Size is an important predictor of a groups' fate. Large groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members.
• There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist group and ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type or the breadth of terrorist goals.
• Terrorist groups that become involved in an insurgency do not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time they end with a negotiated settlement with the government, 25 percent of the time they achieved victory and 19 percent of the time, military groups defeated them.
• Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalistic, and much less likely to be motivated by religion.

"The United States has the necessary instruments to defeat al Qaida, it just needs to shift its strategy and keep in mind that terrorist groups are not eradicated overnight," Jones said.

The study, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaida," can be found at www.rand.org.

The report was prepared by the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center that does research for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands and other defense agencies.

CAIRO, Egypt - Al-Qaida confirmed Aug. 3 the death of a top commander accused of training the suicide bombers who killed 17 American Sailors on the USS Cole eight years ago.

American military intervention in Muslim countries has bred a generation of "angry young men" vulnerable to al-Qa'eda recruitment, a report from a leading security analysis group has said.

Treacherous Alliances: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States
Trita Parsi
Yale University Press, 2007
HB; 361 pages; $28.00
Peter B. Gemma

Any book which receives plaudits ranging from the Arab Washingtonian 1 (“one of its kind in providing in-depth understanding and information”) to the Jewish Chronicle 2 (“a valuable and perhaps long overdue reassessment of the Israeli-Iranian nexus”), must have something unique to say. Indeed, Trita Parsi’s Treacherous Alliances: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States breaks new ground in its analysis of the intriguing intersection between Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington.It’s also a must read for cynics and critics of the neo-conservative-driven Bush foreign policy.

The author, an Iranian native who grew up in Sweden, holds a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and is frequently featured in media reports involving Middle East affairs. Parsi conducted some 130 interviews with key Israeli, Iranian, and American diplomatic, political, and policy experts to present his assessments. The result is a reader-friendly and revealing account of the connections and conflicts between the three nations.

Parsi gives a behind-the-scenes look at diplomacy as it really works or, more accurately, how it does not work. For example, the author writes about a May, 2003 Iranian proposal sent to the White House via a Swiss intermediary. Tehran actually offered to open its nuclear program to inspections, halt its support for Hamas
operations in Palestine, help disarm the Shiite militia Hezbollah in Lebanon, and enter into negotiations concerning the recognition of Israel. In return, Iran asked for an end to economic sanctions and for Washington to acknowledge Tehran as a legitimate regime in international diplomatic and commercial dealings.

The Bush Administration chose to simply neglect and forget the initiative: “ I honestly don’t remember seeing it,” U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a Congressional hearing in February 2007. The complete text of the Iranian proposal can be found in Treacherous Alliance.

Trita Parsi unravels the strategic and tactical lines that pull Iran, Israel, and the U.S. into seemingly competing partnerships. The author illustrates this ongoingjuxtaposition by recounting a situation from the early 1980s: “Only months after the eruption of the hostage crisis, Ahmed Kashani, the youngest son of Grand Ayatollah Abol Qassem Kashani, who had played a key role in the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, visited Israel — most likely the first Iranian to do so after the revolution — to discuss arms sales and military cooperation against Iraq’s nuclear program at Osirak.”

At that time, Israel snubbed U.S. policy and sold Iran military hardware including tires for Phantom jet fighters. In turn, Tehran allowed Iranian Jews to emigrate to Israel. Meanwhile, on stage for public viewing, Iran was trying to have Israel expelled from the United Nations. To discern the dynamics between Tel Aviv and Tehran, Parsi warns not to be“blinded by the condemnatory rhetoric.” He states that, “most observers have failed to notice a critical common interest shared by these two non-Arab powerhouses in the Middle East,” that being “the need to portray their fundamentally strategic conflict as an ideological clash.” The ideological rhetoric does not necessarily reflect the demographic, economic, and political needs of Iran, Israel, and the U.S.

Parsi opines about Iran’s recent history when he writes: “The more the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy was presented as different from that of the shah [whoabdicated in 1980], the more it resembled it at its core ... the ideology had shifted astonishingly. But the end goal remained remarkably similar.” Parsi suggests MiddleEast policy contortions and contradictions between Israel and Iran “have all coincided with geopolitical rather than ideological shifts,” adjusting to meet the exigencies of a particular point in time. He asserts that “no force in Iran’s foreign policy is as dominant as geopolitical considerations.”

Iran, Israel, and the U.S. have intermittently played one side against the other, switching tactics and rhetoric as self interests change. Parsi observes that “theIsraeli-U.S.-Iranian triangle [has] shifted remarkably in just a few years. In the 1980s, Israel was the unlikely defender of and apologist for Iran in Washington, taking great risks to pressure the Reagan administration to open up channels of communication with Iran.” Now Tel Aviv does the opposite because Israel wants “the United States to put Iran under economic and political siege.”

President George Bush’s current strategy is an attempt to segregate and alienate Iran as part of an “evil axis.” That course, says Parsi, challenges Iran’s historic role inthe Gulf region and Middle East — earned by way of its location, population, resources, and military strength. “Washington has sought to establish an order that
contradicts the natural balance by seeking to contain and isolate Iran,” Parsi argues.

In a February 27, 2008 op/ed in the Philadelphia Inquirer 3 Parsi is blunt in thisassessment: “The Bush administration’s apparent disregard for the expressed wishes of Iranian human-rights defenders has made a bad situation worse. When it comes to human rights in the Middle East, the Bush administration has claimed to walk the walk. But that walk clearly has a limp.”

Trita Parsi believes it is in the best interest of the U.S., and ultimately Israel, to reconcile with Iran and engage them in diplomatic, economic, and cultural exchanges — what he describes as “regional integration and collective security.”

Parsi’s premise is backed-up by such newspaper headlines as “Iraq Credits Iran for Helping to Curb Attacks by Militias” and “Iran, Iraq to Cooperate in Development of Joint Oilfields.” 4 David Ignatius, in a March 30, 2008 Washington Post op/ed (“Mideast Openings”), supports this perspective: “We tend to think about conflict as an either/or proposition. Either we negotiate peace, or we destroy the enemy militarily. But in the Middle East, as Gen. John Abizaid, the retired chief of CentralCommand, liked to observe, it’s often a matter of fighting and talking. Right now, we do too much of the former and not enough of the latter.”

In Parsi’s view, the Iranian regime is neither maniacal nor malevolent. He reasons that, “when one scratches the surface, even Iran’s President Ahmadinejad’s venomous outbursts against Israel turn out to have strategic motivations.” Theauthor quotes from a wide variety of credible sources — including former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami — to back-up his assessments. Ben-Ami categorically contends: “Iran is not driven by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by its determination to preserve its regime ... The answer to the Iranian threat is a policy of detente, which would change the Iranian elite’s pattern of conduct.”

According to Treacherous Alliances, Tehran is not necessarily motivated byopposition to Israeli or even religious ideology, but its actions and reactions are chiefly based on national self-interest. President Ahmadinejad and his nation’s ruling mullahs regularly seize on opportunities to enhance and assert Iran’s power and influence in the Gulf region — their opposition to Israel is due more to geopolitics than ideology. Parsi maintains,

Thus, despite Tel Aviv’s latest machinations to demonize Iran internationally,Washington could still broker a balance of powers in the Middle East based on strategic trade-offs. “It is the geopolitical imbalance in the region that renders that conflict all the more unsolvable,” Parsi insists, “unless the underlying conflicts in the region are addressed, any process seeking to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute will be subject to geopolitical rivalries.”

The realpolitik addressed in Treacherous Alliances: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States has received praise ranging from such journals as Mother Jones on the left (11/12/07) and American Conservative on the right (10/22/07). Longstanding Middle East issues are freshly framed by Trita Parsi; his book should be a welcome addition to any library shelf — especially those of Capitol Hill staff, Administration policy wonks, and political campaign operatives ... if those people buy books.

1. (www.arabwashingtonian.org/english/article.php issue=19&articleID=537)
2.(www.thejc.com/home.aspx?ParentId=m12s39&SecId=39&Aid=57262&AtypeId=1)
3. “Bush Administration has fueled the Human-Rights abuses in Iran”
4. New York Times, November 18, 2007; Tehran Times, February 18, 2008
______________
Peter B. Gemma has written for a variety of publications including USA Today, the
Washington Examiner, and Military History magazine.

by Doug Bandow
April 25, 2008

Sen. John McCain is a man of physical courage and personal honor. He's also a warmonger, with little concern for those who would die in his military adventures. The Democrats won't say that. But it's the truth.

Earlier this year Sen. Barack Obama was appearing at a fund-raiser in Grand Forks, N.D. Talk show host Ed Schultz warmed up the crowd by calling John McCain a "warmonger." Sen. Obama distanced himself from Schultz's remarks, with his spokesman opining that "John McCain is not a warmonger and should not be described as such. He's a supporter of a war that Senator Obama believes should have never been authorized and never been waged."

Let us stipulate that McCain believes war is necessary to advance American interests. All that means is that he is a sincere warmonger. He is still far too ready to view war and the threat of war as appropriate and prudent policy tools. If McCain had his way, the U.S. would be fighting several wars at once, none of which would be in America's interest or worth the cost.

There's Iraq, of course. It was a horrid mistake, built on administration fantasies masquerading as intelligence. McCain likes to parade around as a military expert based on his naval service 40 years ago, but his vaunted expertise is never in evidence. On Iraq he ignored all of the discordant voices which disputed virtually every administration claim. He failed to ask any probing questions of an administration that clearly wanted war irrespective of the facts and saw no need to plan for any unpleasant contingencies. McCain's concern about mismanagement of the war didn't begin for months, until the administration's botched performance was evident to all. In short, McCain refused to allow his supposed experience and judgment to get in the way of a war that he evidently wanted America to fight.

At least McCain appeared to treat the decision to go to war with Iraq with a modicum of seriousness. That's not the case with Iran. When asked about the issue on the stump, he famously broke forth with his rendition of "Bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb Iran" set to the tune of the Beach Boys' hit "Barbara Ann." It was a funny performance, if you think the idea of unleashing death and destruction on other people is funny.

Unfortunately, McCain's little ditty appears to encapsulate his view of war: just another policy tool to employ without much concern for the consequences. Has he considered what war with Iran would be like? How Iraqi Shi'ites would respond if Washington bombed Iran? The potential of Iranian subversion throughout the Persian Gulf? The consequences of an expanded Middle Eastern war on Pakistan? If he has, he hasn't bothered to share his analysis with the rest of us. Instead, he prefers to sing about bombing Iran.

Frivolous disdain for consequences characterizes his discussion of war against North Korea. He cheerfully dismissed the concerns of South Korea and Japan, American allies that would bear the worst consequences of any attack on the North. Indeed, absent a full-scale U.S. assault that succeeded in crippling North Korean conventional capabilities, the South's capital of Seoul, presently subject to massed artillery fire and Scud missiles, likely would end up in ruins. It's an ugly picture, but apparently not one that concerned McCain.

He and Sen. Hillary Clinton shared an enthusiasm for war in the Balkans, both having endorsed the foolish attack on Serbia over control of its territory of Kosovo. The U.S. had no security interest in the outcome of one of the world's smaller guerrilla wars, but that didn't deter them from pushing war. However, McCain distinguished himself by publicly advocating a ground war against Serbia. It's bad enough to inaugurate an aerial campaign, largely out of range of Serb air defenses, for no purpose. But to guarantee casualties by sending in ground troops? His enthusiasm for having a big war clearly outran his judgment over how best to fight the conflict.

Anyone willing to go to war with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Serbia is prepared to fight anyone. Most people lean toward peace and believe that only dangerous necessity can justify loosing the dogs of war. Not McCain, who appears to be in permanent "yes" mode. If that famous 3 a.m. phone call came into the McCain White House, he likely would yell "bomb them" into the receiver, then wait until the morning to ask who we had attacked.

It wouldn't be quite so dangerous if he only wanted to attack small, largely defenseless nations like Serbia. But he is intent on jumping into religious and ethnic conflicts that he obviously doesn't understand, as in the Middle East. (Shia? Sunni? What, me worry?) He also wants to threaten nations that possess the ability to retaliate militarily, namely North Korea. Even worse, he advocates confrontation, if not war – right now, anyway – with major powers, most notably China and Russia.

McCain adviser Robert Kagan says that "We have made the mistake of being too passive as Putin has consolidated his autocracy." Exactly what Washington could have done to stop Putin – other than bombing Moscow – isn't clear. But McCain wants to the U.S. to back the state of Georgia against Russia over the status of Abkhazia and Ossetia, as if they mattered one whit to American security. (There's also McCain's unprincipled aggressiveness: he enthusiastically pushes Kosovo's independence, but he opposes self-determination by Abkhazia and Ossetia. In each case his only principle appears to be taking the position most likely to result in conflict between Washington and Russia.)

As for China, McCain has mercifully said less. He evidently knows next to nothing about Islam and the Middle East. He appears to understand even less about China's history and ambitions. But the potential for conflict may grow in coming years, as Beijing behaves more assertively in East Asia, which is, of course, its home region. His "bomb now, ask questions later" philosophy could lead to disaster there.

McCain's foreign policy appears to be a form of neoconservatism squared. All you have to do is threaten everyone around you, and they will kowtow. Talk a little more loudly, brandish your military stick a bit more tightly, and you'll get what you want. If you don't, no problem, just bomb away and you will emerge victorious, so long as you are determined and willing to spill as much blood and treasure as necessary. That's clearly McCain's position in Iraq and likely would govern his approach to any other conflict.

That sounds like a warmonger to me.

But there's more to McCain, another truth that even the Democrats don't want to speak. For instance, Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) observed: "McCain was a fighter pilot, who dropped laser-guided missiles from 35,000 feet. He was long gone when they hit. What happened when they [the missiles] get to the ground? He doesn't know. You have to care about the lives of people. McCain never gets into those issues."

Naturally, the war lobby erupted, and Rockefeller apologized. Obama said that he disagreed and had "a deep respect for Senator McCain's service to this country."

It's hard to ask combat pilot John McCain, whose own life was at risk, along with those of his comrades, to worry about what happened at the receiving end of his weapons. But it is fair to expect policymaker John McCain, cheerful advocate of multiple wars around the globe, to consider what happens when the missiles get to the ground. Yet there's no evidence that he does so.

Consider Iraq. Four thousand Americans are dead, thousands are maimed, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis are dead and injured, and four to five million Iraqis are refugees. Have these numbers registered with policymaker McCain as he justifies the decision to invade? Does he consider the prospect of increasing the toll in advocating fighting as long as necessary for whatever is considered to be victory these days?

When McCain sings about bombing Iran, does he give a thought to the Iranians who would die? Does the prospect of increased fighting in Iraq as a result give him even a momentary pause? Then there's Korea. Does he believe that the U.S. has any responsibility to avoid triggering a war that could generate hundreds of thousands of casualties in South Korea? Did the prospect of killing even more Serbian civilians occur to him as he was pushing for an expanded war in the Balkans? Does the admittedly distant prospect of war, and the casualties that would result, enter his consciousness as he advocates confronting Russia over such geopolitical irrelevancies as Abkhazia and Ossetia? Or in challenging China over who knows what in the coming years? It would appear not.

In short, Rockefeller might have been unfair about pilot John McCain, but he almost certainly was right about policymaker John McCain.

We are left with no good choices for November. Neither Hillary Clinton nor Barack Obama fill most Americans with confidence. Certainly not on economics, where they have rushed to the populist Left, engaging in such silly displays of ignorance as worrying about the impact of trade with Colombia on the $13 trillion U.S. economy. On foreign policy, both appear to be conventional liberal interventionists, right on Iraq, thankfully, but untrustworthy on many if not most other potential wars.

However, John McCain is far worse. Establishment Democrats might be afraid to state the truth, but McCain is a warmonger. A sincere one, yes, but that only makes him more dangerous.

And there is no evidence that he cares about the human consequences of his policy prescriptions. That doesn't make him unique on Capitol Hill – or as president if, God forbid, the worst comes to pass in November. Nevertheless, his callous hawkishness should be a key issue in the coming campaign.

It would be nice to have a president who has suffered for his or her beliefs, in contrast to such chickenhawks as George W. Bush and Richard Cheney. But more important than courage is judgment. And the latter quality is what John McCain completely lacks.

OUTSIDE GARMSER, Afghanistan - U.S. Marines in helicopters and Humvees flooded into a Taliban-held town in southern Afghanistan's most violent province early April 28, the first major American operation in the region in years.

Dunkin’ Donuts received $22 million in federal loans to safeguard its assets against terrorism. Augusta, Georgia, received $3 million to protect its fire hydrants against terrorist tampering. Veterinary schools have called for a four-fold increase in funding to fight hoof-and-mouth disease spread by future terrorists. With a half-billion dollars in homeland security funds available, virtually every interest group in the country is trying to grab a slice of the anti-terrorism pie, no matter how unlikely or bogus the threat. With the U.S. Congress authorizing so much wasteful spending in the name of fighting terrorism, perhaps the 9/11 terrorists got more than they bargained for.

“For a multitude of politicians, interest groups, professional associations, corporations, media organizations, universities, local and state governments and federal agency officials, the War on Terror is now a major profit center, a funding bonanza, and a set of slogans and sound bites to be inserted into budget, project, grant and contract proposals,” writes Independent Institute Research Fellow Ian S. Lustick in a recent op-ed. “For the country as a whole, however, it has become a maelstrom of waste and worry that distracts us from more serious problems.”

From 2003 to 2006, the list of potential terrorist targets compiled by the Department of Homeland Security has grown from 160 to 300,000. That anti-terrorism spending is running amuck is admitted quietly within parts of the federal government. In 2004, Lustick heard a federal official encourage scientists to pursue “outside the box” projects to fight terrorism, although, as Lustick explains in his report, “Our Own Strength Against Us,” the official later admitted off the record that much of the spending was for show, rather than for genuine security. In 2005, the Small Business Administration’s inspector general reported that 85 percent of the businesses granted low-interest SBA loans for counterterrorism failed to establish their eligibility. These and other episodes leave Lustick to conclude that “al Qaeda’s most important accomplishment was not to hijack our planes, but to hijack our political system.”

“The War on Terror Feeding Frenzy,” by Ian S. Lustick (The Hill, 4/22/08)

Also see, “Our Own Strength Against Us: The War on Terror as a Self-Inflicted Disaster,” by Ian S. Lustick

Center on Peace & Liberty

During the early 1990s, Mohamed attempted to infiltrate the FBI on
multiple occasions, and served as an occasional informant starting no
later than 1993.

Torture is immoral and therefore something that conservative
Republicans, who have always given the highest priority to values and
liberties, should never embrace as a policy

Billions of dollars have disappeared, gone to bribe Iraqis and line contractors’ pockets.

Per Gimble’s careful parsing, Feith’s activities were deemed “inappropriate” but “not illegal or unauthorized.” And his investigation’s scope was curiously limited: the year-long inquiry only examined one of the many questionable activities carried out by the Office of Special Plans, the purported link between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. The role of Feith’s office in hatching the imaginary meeting between Mohammad Atta and Iraqi intelligence officials in Prague was significant, but it was only a single element in the much broader pattern of deception that provided the “evidence” President Bush used to persuade the American people that Saddam’s Iraq was an existential threat akin to Hitler’s Germany.

The administration of President George W. Bush has designated the spread of democracy as its principal foreign policy objective with the understanding that burgeoning democracies will make the world a better and safer place for Americans. But critics observe that democracy might not be an exportable commodity, and those who seek to impose it may be doomed to repeat the experience of 5th-century B.C. Athens' ill-fated expedition to Syracuse.

October 11, 2007

Dear State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill Conferees,

We are writing to express strong opposition to funding in the FY 2008 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for State Department programs purporting to support democracy in Iran.

We believe this program, intended to aid the cause of democracy in Iran, has failed and has instead invigorated a campaign by conservative regime elements to harass and intimidate those seeking reform and greater openness in Iran. As segments of the U.S. Administration tout regime change, secret State Department “democracy promotion” funding has enabled Iranian authorities to label those supporting reforms or engagement with the West as foreign agents and traitors. Recent detentions of Iranian-American scholars, journalists, union leaders, student activists, and others are widely viewed as responses to threats posed by U.S.-funded efforts.

Iranian reformers believe democracy cannot be imported and must be based on indigenous institutions and values. The intended beneficiaries of the funding, – human rights advocates, civil society activists and others – uniformly denounce the program. “Washington’s policy of ‘helping’ the cause of democracy has backfired,” wrote Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi in the International Herald Tribune recently. “The Bush Administration should put an end to its misguided policy.” Other respected human rights activists, including Akbar Ganji and Emad Baghi, voice similar sentiments. The fact is, given the current dynamic of conflict between the U.S. and Iranian governments, no organization inside Iran can openly accept funding from the U.S. Government.

The inability of the State Department to expend funds in this account from previous years and its failure to respond to Congressional inquiries for information about the program, further justify its elimination. The program’s fundamental flaw is reflected in the State Department’s inability to generate realistic proposals for activities inside Iran. Less than half of the funds allocated in previous years for “democracy programs” in Iran have been expended – on activities unknown. The additional $75 million requested by President Bush for FY2008 included in the Senate bill is unwarranted and unwanted.

Additionally, we would like to express our support for language in the House bill report which directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to initiate a comprehensive assessment of the capacity of the U.S. Government to effectively administer democracy programs worldwide. We encourage Conferees to direct that GAO give special emphasis to relevant activities in Iran.

As supporters of the values of democracy, we believe any such funding would be better spent on activities outside Iran which could facilitate openness and still promote civil society. We urge Congress to mandate that the Department of State take into account the views of democracy advocates living in Iran – the intended beneficiaries of the funding. As people-to-people exchanges involving scholars, artists, athletes, groups of professionals, and others are proven to foster understanding and cooperation, we urge you to include language in the bill to ease restrictions which make it extremely difficult for NGOs to implement exchanges. Iranian civil society advocates welcome access to information technologies that help expand their access to internet and other media. Finally, while funding for radio and television broadcasting to Iran is extremely important and useful, given the large expansion of Voice of America’s Farsi service last year, we believe further funding should be contingent upon a thorough evaluation of current programming.

Congress can and should play a constructive role in promoting democracy in Iran and elsewhere.
Eliminating so-called democracy promotion programs in Iran, and reprogramming such funds for activities that Iranian democratic activists want, are good first steps.

Signed,

Dr. Trita Parsi, President
National Iranian American Council

Morton H. Halperin, Executive Director
Open Society Policy Center

Michael Ostrolenk, President
American Conservative Defense Alliance

Carah Ong, Iran Policy Analyst
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Robert Naiman, National Coordinator
Just Foreign Policy

Tim Carpenter, Director
Progressive Democrats of America (PDA)

David Culp, Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation

Leslie Cagan, National Coordinator
United for Peace and Justice

Brett Kimberlin, Director
Justice Through Music; Velvet Revolution

Bill Moyer, Executive Director
Backbone Campaign

Lynn M. Kunkle, Policy Director
3D Security Initiative

Melida Arredondo, Gold Star Step Mother to LCpl. Alexander Scott
Arredondo, USMC 08/05 1984 - 08 25 2004

Charles Jenks

Elaine Brower, National Steering Committee
World Can't Wait, Drive Out the Bush Regime;
Military Families Speak Out

Sara Rich, M.S.W.
Mother of Spc. Suzanne Swift, Iraq Veteran

Rev. James Kofski, Asia/Pacific and Middle East Issues
Maryknoll Global Concerns

Kevin M. Martin, Executive Director
Peace Action

Erik Lobo
Camp Casey Peace Institute
Veterans For Peace, Vietnam Veterans Against War

Rob Keithan, Director
Washington Office for Advocacy
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations

John Isaacs, Executive Director
Council for a Livable World

Rachelle Lyndaker Schlabach, Director
Mennonite Central Committee U.S., Washington Office

William Westmiller

Mary Ellen McNish, General Secretary
American Friends Service Committee

Jim Winkler, General Secretary
General Board of Church and Society
United Methodist Church

Dr. Nader Majd
Center For Persian Classical Music

Eileen McCabe, Delegate
Desert Greens, Green Party of Utah

Nickolas Roth, Washington DC Director
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

4/30/07

We are writing to urge you to support including the following language in the FY ’08 Defense Authorization bill intended to help avert a military conflict with Iran:

“Notwithstanding any provision of law and as of the date of enactment, no funds may be authorized for military operations in or related to Iran unless specifically authorized by the Congress.”

We urge all members of House Armed Services Committee and Congress to support this language.

3/21/07

Dear Member of Congress :

The undersigned organizations have joined together because we believe that military action against Iran would not be in the national interest of the United States nor its allies in the region nor Europe and Asia. We urge you to call immediate congressional hearings on administration plans to attack Iran and support diplomacy between the United States and Iran without preconditions.

Among the reasons we oppose apparent Bush Administration plan to widen the war by attacking Iran are:

- It could provoke Iran to retaliate by halting or threatening the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. This would have a devastating effect on the world economy. If Iran was even partly successful, it could raise gasoline prices to $5 per gallon for Americans, according to many economists. A prolonged shortage of oil would very much constrict the entire world economy and put an end to our great era of economic growth. Such an event would cause commodity prices to collapse and a big drop in Chinese purchase of U.S. bonds, with a resultant severe rise in domestic interest rates.

- It will put U.S. soldiers and American interests in the region at far greater risk, not just in Iraq but in surrounding countries. At the very least we could expect many more attacks upon our supply lines between Kuwait and Baghdad, with many more American casualties.

- It will further overextend U.S. forces, already under a great deal of stress, and greatly restrict the ability of the U.S. to respond to other threats which may arise.

- Another lawless attack by America would further undermine legitimate efforts to prevent acts of terror directed against the U.S. by accelerating a cycle of violence and by creating even more terrorists targeting the U.S.
and U.S. interests abroad for many years to come.

It will create a devastating and unnecessary humanitarian disaster where hundreds of thousands of innocent Iranians might be killed.

- Americans of Iranian descent overwhelmingly support a negotiated settlement with Iran, even though they oppose the government there. In addition, attacking Iran would reinforce the current dictatorship and unite all Iranians against America.

- It will threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with retaliation. Iran has already warned the small Gulf States their oil facilities would be at risk in retaliation for any U.S. attack on Iran. The Saudi oil facilities are totally open to aerial missile attack. Increases in insurance rates could, all by itself, result in the suspension of oil shipments. We don't know that the U.S. can protect such targets from every missile or ground threat.

- Even a temporary shut down of the Straits of Hormuz would further weaken Europe and make it even more dependent upon Russian energy supplies.

- Another unilateral American attack on another Muslim nation would make us even more isolated in the world, with even more enemies.

- As was the case with Iraq, military action against Iran is being justified on false premises and without conclusive intelligence that Iran poses an imminent threat to the United States. There is little credible intelligence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. Some U.S. and other intelligence agencies have estimated that Iran is still up to ten years away from developing a nuclear weapon. Even the most cautious estimates by Israeli intelligence conclude that Iran is at least two or three years away from the nuclear weapons threshold. Time may be running out for George W. Bush, but it is not running out for America.

- Claims that Iran is directly assisting insurgents in Iraq remain unsubstantiated and implausible since the majority of identified insurgents are Sunnis (including al-Qaeda), while the Iranians are Shia linked to parties within the current Iraqi government.

- Given 26 years of US refusal to start a dialogue with Iran and recent setbacks in the United Nations Security Council, mounting pressure and preconditions are not sufficient to prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. Per the recommendations of the bi-partisan Iraq Study Group, a US-Iran diplomatic strategy can help stabilize Iraqi sectarian violence and provide a foundation for broadening discussions to include the nuclear program and other grievances.

In the absence of talks, President Bush's escalation of inflammatory rhetoric against Iran, his administration's refusal to rule out military action, the recent deployment of military assets, changes in the rules of engagement in Iraq regarding Iranians, all indicate that a military attack is likely.

We see a disturbing pattern emerging in comments by President Bush and other administration officials, provocative deployments of U.S. military assets, changes in rules of engagement vis-à-vis Iranians in Iraq, and press reports that seem to indicate preparations for U.S. military action against Iran are underway.

For these reasons, we urge you to use all the powers available to you as a Member of Congress to prevent another disaster for America by ruling out the use of any appropriations for the purpose of funding covert action in Iran or for the use of military force against Iran such as proposed by Rep. Jones in H.J. RES. 14. We also urge you to vigorously scrutinize all intelligence presented on Iran and call for a serious diplomatic strategy to engage Iran in dialog such as proposed by Rep. Paul in H .J. RES 43.

Sincerely,
Undersigned

Ivan Eland, Ph.D. Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty The Independent Institute
Jim Babka, President DownsizeDC.org, Inc.
Ivan Eland, Ph.D. Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty The Independent Institute
John Whitehead, President, Rutherford Institute
Marcus Epstein, Executive Director, American Cause
Jon Utley Associate PublisherThe American Conservative
Phil Giraldi contributing editor The American Conservative
Doug Bandow, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan
Michael D. Ostrolenk, ,National Director, American Conservative Defense Alliance
Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council